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Abstract—Data privacy is an important concern in machine
learning, and is fundamentally at odds with the task of training
useful learning models, which typically require acquisition of
large amounts of private user data. One possible way of fulfilling
the machine learning task while preserving user privacy is to
train the model on a transformed, noisy version of the data,
which does not reveal the data itself directly to the training
procedure. In this work, we analyze the privacy-utility trade-
off of two such schemes for the problem of linear regression:
additive noise, and random projections. In contrast to previous
work, we consider a recently proposed notion of differential
privacy that is based on conditional mutual information (MI-DP),
which is stronger than the conventional (ε,δ )-differential privacy,
and use relative objective error as the utility metric. We find
that projecting the data to a lower-dimensional subspace before
adding noise attains a better trade-off in general. We also make a
connection between privacy problem and (non-coherent) SIMO,
which has been extensively studied in wireless communication,
and use tools from there for the analysis. We present numerical
results demonstrating the performance of the schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
High-complexity models are needed to solve modern learn-
ing problems, which require large amounts of data to achieve
low generalization error. However, acquiring such data from
users directly compromises the user privacy. Training useful
machine learning models without compromising user privacy
is an important and challenging research problem. One natural
way to tackle this problem is to keep the data itself private,
and reveal only a processed, noisy version of the data to the
training procedure. Ideally, such processing would completely
hide the content of the data samples, while still providing
useful information to the training objective. In this paper, we
analyze the privacy-utility trade-off of two such schemes for
the linear regression problem: additive noise, where training is
performed on the data samples with additive Gaussian noise;
and random projections, where each data sample is randomly
projected to a lower-dimensional subspace through Johnson-
Lindenstrauss Transform (JLT) [1] before adding Gaussian
noise. We explore guarantees for a model that is trained on
such transformed data for a given privacy constraint.
Differential privacy is perhaps the most well-known notion
for privacy [2], and has been applied to a variety of domains
(we refer reader to [3] and [2] and references therein). It
assumes a strong adversary which has access to all data
samples except one, thereby ensuring robustness of the pri-
vacy guarantee to adversaries with side-information about the
database. Moreover differential privacy makes no distributional
assumption on the data.
In this work we use the recently proposed notion of mutual
information-differential privacy (MI-DP) to analyze the pri-
vacy performance of the schemes. This connects to the natural
information-theoretic notion of privacy, as well as enabling the
use of more standard tools for analysis. Moreover it is shown
in [4] that MI-DP directly implies (ε,δ )-differential privacy.
Our contributions are as follows: First, we derive closed-
form expressions on the relative objective error achievable by
additive noise (Theorem 1) and random projection schemes
(Theorem 2), under a privacy constraint, and show that in
general random projections achieve better privacy-utility trade-
off. We use results from randomized linear algebra [5] to prove
the utility guarantees. Second, using the MI-DP measure, and
using the fact that the random projection matrix is private, we
make a connection between the MI-DP and SIMO channel, and
show that non-coherent SIMO bounds do not give a stronger
scaling guarantee than their coherent counterparts. Third, we
present numerical results demonstrating the performance of
the two schemes.
Related work. The works in [6]–[8] propose perturbing the
objective to provide privacy guarantees on the trained model,
where the training procedure is trusted and has access to the
full database, and the adversary can only access the result-
ing trained model. In contrast, we assume that the training
procedure itself may be adversarial, and is not given access
to the raw data samples. In the context of linear regression
and related problems, the works in [5], [9] propose random
projections to provide privacy, by showing that the mutual
information between the raw and projected data samples
grows sublinearly with dimensions. However, this does not
necessarily translate to a formal differential privacy guarantee
on the data samples. Random projection as a tool to provide
differential privacy has also been considered in [10] and [11].
The main difference of these works with ours is that they
project each data vector individually to a lower-dimensional
subspace, whereas we consider mixing samples across the
database, such that the effective number of “mixed" samples
is fewer than original.
In terms of motivation and techniques, the works in [12],
[13] are the most closely related to ours. These works consider
JLT in the context of linear regression, and prove that it guar-
antees differential privacy for well-conditioned data matrices.
However, no explicit guarantee on the achievable empirical
risk is given. In contrast, we directly analyze the privacy-
utility trade-off of additive noise and random projections,
where utility is measured by the objective value achieved by
the trained model under the privacy scheme, normalized by
the true minimum of the objective. We also use the stronger
MI-DP privacy1, instead of the traditional (ε,δ )-differential
privacy. We emphasize that the main novelty of our work lies
in the analysis of the algorithms and the resulting theoretical
guarantees, and not in the algorithms themselves.
Paper organization. In Section II we give a brief overview
on different privacy metrics followed by the precise problem
formulation. Section III includes the main theoretical results of
this work. The proof outlines are given in Section IV. Section
V gives the numerical results.
II. FORMULATION AND BACKGROUND
In this paper we consider the quadratic optimization
min
θ
g(θ ) :=min
θ
‖Xθ − y‖22, (1)
where X ∈Rn×d is the data matrix that each row corresponds
to one user and y ∈Rn are the response variables. We denote
a solution of this optimization problem as θ ⋆. We use Xi, j
to denote the j-th feature of the i-th user data point for
i ∈ {1. · · · ,n}, j ∈ {1, · · · ,d}. We assume the number of data
points is greater than the number of features and X is full
column rank. We assume that |Xi, j| ≤ 1. Throughout this paper,
we use bold letters for random variables to distinguish them
from deterministic quantities.
Consider a database DN :=(D1, · · · ,DN) that returns a query
according to a randomized mechanism q(.). Let D−i denote
the set of database entries excluding Di.
Definition 1 (ε-mutual-information). A randomized mecha-
nism q(.) satisfies ε-mutual-information (MI-DP) if
sup
i,P(DN)
I(Di;q(DN)|D−i)≤ ε bits, (2)
where the supremum is taken over all distribution on DN .
We aim to preserve the privacy of each entry
of X , therefore, in the context of our work,
D := (X1,1, · · · ,X1,d ,X2,1, · · · ,X2,d , · · · ,Xn,d).
The notion of ε-MI-DP is closely related to (ε,δ ) differ-
ential privacy [14]. We first define the notion of neighbor in
databases:
Definition 2 (Neighbor). Two databases DN and D¯N are called
neighbor if they differ only in one entry.
In the context of our problem, two data matrices are
neighbors if they only differ in one entry. Now we are ready
to define (ε,δ ) differential privacy.
1In [4], it is shown that for discrete alphabets, the two notions are
equivalent; however MI-DP is strictly stronger for continuous alphabets.
Definition 3 ((ε,δ ) differential privacy). A randomized mech-
anism q(.) satisfies (ε,δ ) differential privacy (DP) if for all
neighboring databases DN and D¯N and all S ⊆ Range(q(.)),
Pr(q(DN) ∈ S)≤ eε Pr(q(D¯N) ∈ S)+ δ . (3)
We say q(.) satisfies (δ )-DP if it satisfies (0,δ )-differential
privacy.
Note that neither of MI-DP nor DP impose distributional
assumptions on the database and the probabilities arise com-
pletely from the randomization of the mechanism.
Proposition 1 (Theorem 1 in [4]). ε-MI-DP is stronger than
(ε,δ )-DP in the sense that for all ε > 0 if a mechanism is
ε-MI-DP, there exists ε ′,δ ′ such that the mechanism satisfies
(ε ′,δ ′)-DP. We denote this relation with ε-MI-DP (ε,δ )-DP.
Furthermore, we have the following relation:
ε-MI-DP
(a)
 (δ )-DP (b)≡ (ε,δ )-DP, (4)
where  is interpreted as being stronger and (b) means
(δ )-DP (ε,δ )-DP and (ε,δ )-DP (δ )-DP.
Proposition 2 (See Lemma 2 in [4]). If a mechanism is
ε-MI-DP then it also satisfies (0,
√
2
log(e)ε)-DP.
Let us denote a solution to the original problem (1) with
θ ⋆. Let us denote the the cost function of the transformed
problem with gˆ(θ ) with a minimum of θˆ ∈ argminθ gˆ(θ ). We
define the relative error of this transformed problem as the
smallest η ≥ 1 such that,
g(θˆ)≤ ηg(θ ⋆). (5)
In this paper we consider the achievable relative error for
linear regression given ε-MI-DP requirement.
Notation. We denote the condition number of X with
κ(X) := ‖X‖2‖X†‖2 = σmax(X)
σmin(X)
, (6)
where X† is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of X and ‖X‖2
is the spectral norm of X .
We denote that ratio of l2 norm of the projection of y onto
the column space of X over the l2 norm of the residual with:
r(y) :=
‖Xθ ⋆‖2
‖Xθ ⋆− y‖2 . (7)
where ‖Xθ ⋆‖2 is the l2 norm of the vector Xθ ⋆.
We define fi(X) :=
√
n
∑
j=1
|X2i, j|−max j |X2i, j| for
i ∈ {1. · · · ,d}, and f (X) :=mini fi(X). In order to give
guarantees on the privacy of the projection method the
amount of additional noise is expressed in terms of f (X).
III. PRIVACY-UTILITY TRADE OFF
In this section we analyze the utility-privacy trade-off for
both an additive noise mechanism as well as a scheme with
random projection. We compare their utility-guarantees for the
same level of ε-MI-DP privacy.
A. Additive Gaussian Noise
In order to satisfy privacy, we add Gaussian noise directly
to the data,
XAN(X) := X+σANN, (8)
where N ∈ Rn×d with i.i.d. entries drawn from N (0,1) and
σ2AN(ε) :=
1
22ε − 1 , (9)
is the variance of the noise.
θAN := argminθ ‖XANθ − y‖22︸ ︷︷ ︸
gAN(θ)
, (10)
Theorem 1 (Privacy-Utility for Additive Noise). Given a data
set X and the randomized mechanism XAN(X) with ε-MI-DP
constraint, with probability at least 1− 2e
− σmax(X)2
2σ2
AN
(ε)
δ 2
we have
the following bound on the relative error of the transformed
problem:
ηAN ≤
(
1+
κ(X)(∆(X ,ε)+ δ )
1−κ(X)(∆(X ,ε)+ δ )(κ(X)+ r(y))
)2
, (11)
if κ(X)∆(ε,X) < 1, where ∆(X ,ε) = σAN (ε)σmax(X)
(√
n+
√
d
)
and
δ > 0 is a free parameter2.
Note that if σ2max(X) scales linearly with n then ∆ converges
to a constant term. Based on Proposition 2, additive noise also
satisfies (δ )-DP.
B. Gaussian Random Projections
We encode the data matrix using JLT to a lower dimensional
space n′ and we add Gaussian noise, when necessary, to guar-
antee ε-MI-DP. We denote the encoded data by XRP ∈ Rn′×d
and yRP ∈Rn′ :
XRP(X) := SX +σRPN, yRP := Sy, (12)
where S ∈ Rn′×n represents the random projection with i.i.d.
N (0,1) entries and N ∈ Rn′×d is the noise added to ensure
the privacy with i.i.d. entries drawn from N (0,1), and
σ2RP(X ,ε) :=
( n′
22ε − 1 − f
2(X)
)
+
, (13)
is the variance of the additive noise3.
We solve the following problem to estimate the model:
θRP := argminθ ‖XRPθ − yRP‖22︸ ︷︷ ︸
gRP(θ)
, (14)
Theorem 2 (Privacy-Utility for Random Projection). Given
a dataset X and the randomized mechanism XRP(X) with ε-
MI-DP constraint and a projection dimension of n′ < n, with
2Note that support of δ is restricted to the set where κ(X)(∆+δ )≤ 1
3Note that our algorithm does not reveal this quantity explicitly avoiding
an extra privacy leakage.
probability at least 1−c1e−c2n′δ 2 , we have the following bound
on the relative error of the transformed problem:
ηRP ≤ (1+ δ )2(1+ l1(X ,ε))(1+ l2(X ,ε))2, (15)
where l1(X ,ε) := σ2RP(X ,ε)
(
maxi
σi(X)
σ2i (X)+σ
2
RP
)2
r2(y),
l2(X ,ε) :=
σ2RP(X ,ε)
σ2min(X)+σ
2
RP(X ,ε)
r(y), δ ≥
√
c0
d
n′ is a free
parameter, and c0, c1 and c2 are constants.
Corollary 1. The random projection methods also satisfies
(δ )-DP for δ :=
√
2
log(e)ε .
Corollary 2. Note that the amount of noise added to the
projected data is σ2RP(ε,X) =
(
n′
22ε−1 − f 2(X)
)
+
. If f 2 scales
linearly with n and n′ = o(n), asymptotically the noise vari-
ance goes to zero, i.e., random projection itself guarantees
the privacy. Furthermore, for a given δ , ηRP ≤ (1+ δ )2
asymptotically as two other terms in (15) vanish.
Remark 1. In the proof of Theorem 2 in order to derive
an upper bound for (2) we make a connection to the SIMO
non-coherent channel. We used the coherent SIMO bound for
upper bounding this quantity. One may ask if we can get a
tighter bound by using the tighter non-coherent bounds (see
for example [15]). The known non coherent bound,
C ≤ n
′
2
log(1+
1
σ2RP+ f
2(X)
). (16)
does not give any improvement. This bound (16) is known to be
tight for the low-SNR regime [15]. Therefore when f 2 = Ω(n)
asymptotically both bounds yield the same result.
IV. PROOF OUTLINES
A. Theorem 1
Proof Outline. The proof consists of two steps. First we derive
the minimum amount of noise needed to ensure ε-MI-DP for
XAN with respect to any feature of users, which is stated in
the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Privacy Guarantee for the additive noise). If
σ2AN =
1
22ε−1 then XAN is ε-MI-DP with respect to any entry
of X.
Proof. We show that (2) is bounded by ε for this choice of
σ2AN and q(X) := XAN . Due to the symmetry of the problem,
we fix Di to be the first feature of the first data point without
loss of generality. Note that
I(X1,1;XAN |X−(1,1)) = I(X1,1;X1,1+σANN1,1|X−(1,1)). (17)
By expanding the mutual information:
I(X1,1;X1,1+σANN1,1|X−(1,1))
= h(X1,1+σANN1,1|X−(1,1))− h(X1,1+σANN1,1|X)
(a)
= h(X1,1+σANN1,1|X−(1,1))− h(σANN1,1), (18)
where (a) holds because the noise is independent of the data.
Now we need to take the maximization over all possible
distribution on X. Note that the absolute value of each entry
is bounded by 1 therefore we need to take the supremum over
all distribution inside this ball. The absolute value constraint
implies the second moment constraint for all distribution
defined on it, therefore by using the maximum entropy bound
the result follows:
sup
P(X)
I(X1,1;XAN |X−(1,1))≤ 12 log(1+
1
σ2AN
) = ε. (19)
The second step bounds the relative error. We use perturba-
tion theory in the least square setup (see Theorem 5.1 in [16])
and probabilistic bounds on the maximum singular value of
an i.i.d. Gaussian to derive the result [17]. The details of the
proof are provided in [18].
B. Theorem 2
Proof Outline. The proof consists of two steps. First we find
the variance of noise needed to add to satisfy ε-MI-DP that
results to ε-MI-DP model, θRP. Following lemma characterizes
the amount of noise sufficient to make the mechanism ε-MI-
DP.
Lemma 2. If σ2RP := (
n′
22ε−1 − f 2(X))+ then XRP is ε-MI-DP
with respect to any entry of X.
Proof. We show that the conditional mutual information (2)
is bounded by ε for this choice of σ2RP. Due to the symmetry
of the problem, we fix Di to be the first feature of the first
data point.
max
P(X)∈P
I(X1,1;XRP|X−(1,1)) (20)
= max
P(X−(1,1))p(X1,1|X−(1,1))
E
X−(1,1) [I(X1,1;XRP|X−(1,1) = X−(1,1))],
(a)
≤ max
P(X−(1,1))
E
X−(1,1) [ max
P(X1,1|X−(1,1))
I(X1,1;XRP|X−(1,1) = X−(1,1))],
where P is the set of distributions which assign non-zero
measure to X only if the absolute value of each entry is
upper bounded by 1 and f (X) is lower bounded by the
f (.) evaluated for the original database, (a) follows from the
Jensen’s Inequality and the fact that maximization over the
conditional distribution is a convex function. Now we find
upper bounds on the the inside of the expectation, note that
columns of XRP rather than first one does not have any term
associated with X1,1 and they are conditionally independent,
therefore we can write
max
P(X1,1|X−(1,1))
I(X1,1;XRP|X−(1,1) = X−(1,1))
= max
P(X1,1|X−(1,1))
I(SX(:,1)+σRPN
(:,1);X1,1|X−(1,1) = X−(1,1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(⋆)
,
where X (:,1) denotes the first column of X . We find an upper
bound on (⋆) for a fixed set of X−(1,1) We observe that (⋆)
is same as the capacity of the following non-coherent SIMO
channel with Rayleigh fading with a unit power constraint:
z= S(:,1)X1,1+∑
i6=1
S(:,i)Xi,1+σRPN
(:,1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ν
, (21)
where z ∈ Rn′ is the first column of XRP which we treat here
as the output of the channel. Note that Xi,1 ( i 6= 1 ) are treated
as constants for this channel and therefore ν is effectively a
zero mean i.i.d. Gaussian noise with the covariance of
E[ννT ] = (σ2RP+∑
i6=1
(Xi,1)
2)In′ = σ
2
ν In′ , (22)
Now we bound the capacity of this channel, We use the
coherent upper bound for the capacity of this channel:
max
P(X1,1)
I(X1,1;z)≤ max
P(X11,1)
I(X1,1;z,S(:,i))
(a)
≤ E
S(:,i) [
1
2
log(1+
‖S(:,i)‖2
σ2ν
)]
(b)
≤ 1
2
log(1+E
S(:,i)[
‖S(:,i)‖2
f (X)2+σ2RP
])
(c)
≤ ε. (23)
Note that the absolute value constraint implies the second
moment constraint for all distribution defined on it and (a)
follows from the maximum entropy bound, (b) follows directly
from the Jensen’s Inequality, (c) comes from the fact that the
outer maximization is over distributions that assign non-zero
measure to X only if f (X)≥ f (X).
Now we derive the utility guarantee for this method. Note
that by rewriting XRP=
[
S N
][ X
σRPI
]
= S˜
[
X
σRPI
]
we observe
that adding direct noise to the projected data can be interpreted
as the random projection of the l2 regularized least square
problem (Ridge Regression), i.e.,
θRP = argminθ‖XRPθ − yRP‖22 (24)
= argminθ‖S˜
([ X
σRPI
]
θ −
[
y
0
])
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RR
‖22. (25)
Therefore we can split the utility analysis into two parts,
1) What is the utility loss for the l2 regularized least square?
2) What is the utility loss for the randomized sketching
(JLT)?
We use the standard SVD argument to bound the Ridge
Regression relative error and by following Pilanci et. al. [5]
(see Corollary 2) we give guarantees on the sketching step.
The details of the proof are provided in [18].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We numerically evaluate the relative error η achieved by
the schemes in Section III subject to an ε-MI-DP constraint.
A. Random data
We generate the elements Xi, j i.i.d. uniformly in the in-
terval [−1,1], where X ∈ Rn×800, and n = 1000k with k ∈
{1,2, . . . ,20}. For each case, the additive noise parameter σAN
is computed according to (9). Similarly, the additive noise σRP
is computed according to (13). Given k, we evaluate three
choices of n′: logarithmic (n′1 := 1000(log(k)+ 1)), linear
(n′2 := 1000
k+1
2 ), and full (n
′ = n = 1000k). The resulting
relative error curves are given in Figure 1 for ε = 0.5, averaged
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Fig. 1. Relative error of the schemes for ε = 0.5, for random data
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Fig. 2. Relative error vs. ε , for n= 10000, for random data
over 5 trials. We note that random projection results in
uniformly better privacy-utility trade-off compared to additive
noise. Further, at this regime of ε , lower projection dimensions
result in significantly better trade-off. Figure 2 plots the
achieved relative error as a function of ε , for n = 10000. We
note that the relative error decreases linearly until it saturates
for all schemes, and for stricter privacy constraints (small ε),
lower projection dimension achieves smaller relative error. As
ε tends higher, the privacy constraint becomes less restrictive,
and schemes with higher projection dimension perform better
because of the additional rows of information.
B. MNIST Handwritten Digits Dataset
We consider a reduced version of the MNIST hand-written
digits dataset [19], where we only take the digits 4 and 9,
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Fig. 3. Test error of the schemes for ε = 0.2, for MNIST
leading to 11791 data samples, and only consider the 300
pixels that contain the most energy across these data samples.
Mapping the digit labels to +1 and −1, and vectorizing each
data image, we solve the corresponding linear problem, which
generates a model that classifies 4’s versus 9’s. Figure 3 gives
the resulting test error (subject to a 80%/20% training/test set
partition) for the logarithmic (n′1 := 500(log(k)+ 1)), linear
(n′2 := 500
k+1
2 ), and full (n
′ = n= 1000k) random projections,
as well as additive noise. To evaluate values of n smaller
than 11791, we randomly sample the dataset. The results are
averaged over 10 trials. Similar to the random case, we observe
that random projection with logarithmic dimensions result in
the best performance, while preserving MI-DP with ε = 0.2.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIVE GAUSSIAN NOISE
In order to derive bounds for the utility performance of
additive noise, we use the perturbation theory in the least
square setup [16]. For a given N and σAN we have the
following deterministic bound on the utility,
Lemma 3 (See Theorem 5.1 in [16]). Assuming rank(X) =
rank(X+σANN) = d and κ(X)∆(ε,N,X)< 1:
‖XθAN− y‖2
‖Xθ ⋆− y‖2 ≤ 1+
κ(X)∆(ε,N,X)
1−κ(X)∆(ε,N,X)(κ(X)+ r(y)), (26)
where ∆(ε,N,X) = σAN
‖N‖2
‖X‖2 .
It is well-known that the maximum singular value of N ∈
R
n×d converges almost surely to
√
n+
√
d asymptotically. For
the non-asymptotic bounds, we use the following lemma:
Proposition 3 (See [17]). If N ∈Rn×d is a Gaussian random
matrix with entries drawn from N (0,1), then
P(σmax(N)≤
√
n+
√
d+ t)≥ 1− 2e− t
2
2 , t ≥ 0. (27)
By combining Lemma 3 and Proposition 3 and the choice
of σAN (26), Theorem 1 directly follows.
APPENDIX B
GAUSSIAN RANDOM PROJECTIONS
In this section, we derive utility guarantee on the perfor-
mance of random projection for the given value of σRP. Note
that by rewriting XRP=
[
S N
][ X
σRPI
]
= S˜
[
X
σRPI
]
we observe
that adding direct noise to the projected data can be interpreted
as the random projection of the l2 regularized least square
problem (Ridge Regression), i.e.,
θRP = argminθ‖XRPθ − yRP‖22 (28)
= argminθ‖S˜
([ X
σRPI
]
θ −
[
y
0
])
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RR
‖22, (29)
Let us denote the solution to the Ridge Regression problem
with θRR = argminθ‖Xθ − y‖2 +σ2RP‖θ‖2, therefore we can
write:
‖XθRP− y‖22
‖Xθ ⋆− y‖22
=
‖XθRR− y‖22
‖Xθ ⋆− y‖22︸ ︷︷ ︸
η1
× ‖XθRR− y‖
2
2+σ
2
RP‖θRR‖22
‖XθRR− y‖22︸ ︷︷ ︸
η2
× ‖XθRP− y‖
2
2+σ
2
RP‖θRP‖22
‖XθRR− y‖22+σ2RP‖θRR‖22︸ ︷︷ ︸
η3
× ‖XθRP− y‖
2
2
‖XθRP− y‖22+σ2RP‖θRP‖22︸ ︷︷ ︸
η4
. (30)
It is clear that η4 < 1, therefore we find bounds for each of
η1, η2 and η3.
Using the following Lemma, η1 ≤
(
1+ σ
2
RP
σ2min+σ
2
RP
r(y)
)2
.
Lemma 4. Let us denote the solution to the l2 regularized least
square problem with θRR(λ ) := argminθ‖Xθ − y‖22 + λ‖θ‖22
and θ ⋆ = argminθ‖Xθ − y‖22, then we have the following
bound on the empirical risk loss given that X is full rank:
‖XθRR(λ )− y‖2
‖Xθ ⋆− y‖2 ≤ 1+
λ
σ2min+λ
r(y). (31)
Proof. Using triangle inequality we can write the LHS of (31):
‖Xθ ⋆− y+X(θRR(λ )−θ ⋆)‖2
‖Xθ ⋆− y‖2 ≤ 1+
‖X(θRR(λ )−θ ⋆)‖2
‖Xθ ⋆− y‖2 .
(32)
Let us denote the SVD decomposition of X by X =UΣV T ,
where U ∈ Rn×d spans the column space, Σ ∈ Rd×d is the
diagonal matrix of the singular values and V ∈ Rd×d spans
the row space of X . We use the close form solution for θ ⋆
and θRR to derive bounds for ‖X(θRR(λ )−w⋆)‖2.
θ ⋆ = (XTX)−1XT y=VΣ−1UTy (33)
θRR = (X
TX+λ I)−1XT y=V (Σ2+λ I)−1ΣUTy, (34)
therefore
‖X(θRR(λ )−θ ⋆)‖2 = ‖U Σ[(Σ2+λ I)−1−Σ−2]Σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
−D
UT y‖2
≤ ‖UDUTy‖2
(a)
≤ σmax(D)‖UTy‖2
(b)
=
(
λ
σ2min+λ
)
‖Xθ ⋆‖2. (35)
(a) and (b) follow directly since D is a diagonal matrix with
i-th entry of λ
σ2i +λ
, where σi is i-th singular value of X so
σmax(D)≤ λσ2min+λ . By combining (32) and (35), (31) follows
directly.
Corollary 3. Let us denote the solution to the l2 regularized
least square problem with θRR(λ ) := argminθ‖Xθ − y‖22 +
λ‖θ‖22 and θ ⋆ = argminθ‖Xθ − y‖22, we have the following
bound on the norm of the θRR:
‖θRR‖2 ≤
(
max
i
σi
σ2i +λ
)
‖Xθ ⋆− y‖2, (36)
Proof. Proof directly follows by using the closed form solution
for θRR,
‖θRR‖= ‖V (Σ2+λ I)−1ΣUT y‖2
= ‖(Σ2+λ I)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
D′
ΣUTy‖2,
≤ σmax(D′)‖UTy‖2 (37)
=
(
max
i
σi
σ2i +λ
)
‖Xθ ⋆‖2. (38)
By Corollary 3 we have the following bound on η2:
η2 ≤ 1+σ2RP
(
max
i
σi
σ2i +σ
2
RP
)2
r2(y), (39)
We use results of Pilanci et. al. [5] for η3:
Proposition 4 (See Corollary 2 in [5]). Sup-
pose θRP = argminθ‖S˜
([ X
σRPI
]
θ −
[
y
0
])‖22 and
θRR := argminθ‖Xθ − y‖22+σ2RP‖θ‖22 where S˜ ∈ Rn
′×n is
a random Gaussian matrix with entries drawn from N (0,1).
With probability at least 1− c1e−c2n′δ 2 for δ ≥
√
c0
d
n′ :
‖XθRP− y‖22+σ2RP‖θRP‖22
‖XθRR− y‖22+σ2RP‖θRR‖22
≤ (1+ δ )2, (40)
where c0, c1 and c2 are constants.
Result of Theorem 2 follows directly by using bounds on
η1, η2 and η3.
